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D/NESA 82-218
4 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR:

[REDACTED]
OEA/LLD

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FROM:

Helene L. Boatner
Director, Near East/South Asia Analysis

SUBJECT:

Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Staffers on Iraqi
Links to Terrorism

1. Attached is a copy of the Memorandum for the Record on yesterday's briefing and a memorandum I have done to Nat Howell at State, who is the relevant country director. Would you please contact the staffers involved and tell them that the DDI analysts who met with them were inaccurate in saying that there had been no specific papers requested of us in connection with the decision to remove Iraq from the list of countries supporting terrorism. There was a paper prepared last fall on Patron State Support for International Terrorism. It was done at the request of the State Department, which specified the countries to be covered, including Iraq. Individual country sections were contributed by analysts in NESA and other regional offices, and the paper was put together by the Terrorism Center in OGI. The staffers are almost certain to ask for a copy of it; [REDACTED] in OGI (1030R) is the person you should get in touch with when that happens.

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[REDACTED]
Helene L. BoatnerAttachment:
As stated

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4 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Near East/South Asia Analysis

FROM:

[redacted]
Chief, Persian Gulf Division
Near East/South Asia Analysis

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SUBJECT: Briefing of Senate Foreign Relations Staffers
on Iraqi Links to Terrorism

1. NESA and OGI analysts met with Mike Kraft and Chuck Burk of the Senate Foreign Relations staff to discuss Iraq's involvement in international terrorism on 3 March at the staffer's request. NESA personnel were [redacted]
[redacted]
represented the OGI Terrorism Center.

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2. Questions first focused on evidence of Iraqi support for the recent violence in Syria, then on Iraqi support for terrorism in general. The staff members asked if CIA had been consulted by State specifically on the issue of Iraqi support for terrorism and whether CIA has been tasked by State or Commerce to produce any papers before the decision was made to remove Iraq from the list of states supporting terrorism.

3. With regard to Syria, the analysts indicated that Iraq's role was secondary and more in the nature of looking for ways to exploit an already unstable situation. They indicated there was some evidence that Iraq provided safehaven, arms and propaganda support for Muslim Brotherhood members.

4. Staff members began the questioning on Iraq by asking if CIA had recently completed a study on Iraqi links to terrorism. We said yes, and the members said they would request the paper. We explained that the paper was self-initiated and begun last September.

5. Questions and answers focused on Iraq's behavior over the past year. We affirmed a reduction in evidence of Iraqi links to terrorist actions involving Europe and Israel, and

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linked this changed behavior to Iraqi foreign policy goals that emphasize access to Western technology and a larger role in international, Arab and Third World affairs. We indicated increased Iraqi sensitivity to their international image.

6. In response to questioning we stated that violence was still a key Iraqi instrument used against its opponents wherever they are found. The shift noted above was largely one of the targets rather than an end to the use of violence. In support we cited activities against Iranians--particularly in Lebanon--and Iraqi Kurds, Shia and Communists.

7. The staffers asked about the level of Iraqi financial aid to terrorist groups in Lebanon. We referred to a staff note done by NESAs last spring; they requested a copy.

8. On the subject of contacts with State or Commerce prior to the decision to remove Iraq from the "terrorist list," both NESAs and OGI analysts replied that there had been no consultation or specific papers requested of us. There is reason to believe that the OGI reply is not correct. We are looking into the matter and if this should prove to be the case we will correct the record with the committee staffers.

9. Following the meeting, I asked the senior staffer about committee plans. He said he thought they would hold a hearing and that the Senators might want to hear our views. I indicated we were not enthusiastic about the prospect.

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